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Obscenity- the Law, a
Dissenting Voice
By ERWIN A. ELIAs*
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to attempt to illuminate the law
with respect to regulation and prohibition of publications' al-
legedly obscene and pornographic. The writer had not been
called upon to express opinions on the wisdom of the law and
for this he was initially most grateful. However, it quickly be-
came evident that this article could not be written without
editorial comment and now no pretense is made that this consti-
tutes the product of a neutral mind. Rather than clutter the
main body of this analysis with editorializing it was decided to
state the opinions held as a prologue to a discussion of the law
itself.
(1) Although emphatically opposed to capricious censorship,
along with genocide, forcible overthrow of the government, dis-
respect for the flag, etc., there is no inclination to embrace what
appears to be the prevailing view of most commentators and the
Supreme Court that whatever is in fact published is entitled to
near absolute protection. Perhaps it is unrealistic to assume
that there must be some satisfactory middle ground between
the extremes of complete censorship and complete absence of
restraint. Both alternatives appear equally undesirable.
(2) If a choice must be made the writer is inclining more
and more toward favoring regulation and even censorship with
respect to publications dealing with sex. It is felt, perhaps
erroneously, that the great majority of American people would
agree with this view were they to peruse some of the currently
o Professor of Law, Baylor Umversity Law School.
I The terms "publications," "publisher," etc., are used throughout this paper
to cover all media of communication, books, magamnes, motion pictures, television
presentations, pictures, paintings, etc.
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protected publications the writer has looked at in the last month.
Prior to this research the resume of censor s decisions found m
a dissenting opinion in Times Film Corp. v. Caty of Chicago2
had been very thought-provoking and, indeed, persuasive.
Certainly some if not all the decisions were unjustified. On
reflection, however, and with the aforementioned "research" m
mind, the persuasive quality has diminished considerably. In
what manner was society injured because the words "rape" and
"contraceptive" were deleted from the film "Anatomy of a
Murder?" What great loss to the world if Henry Miller's Troptc
of Cancer had never seen the light of day other than of the
lexicon of four letter words?
On the other hand, who can say what damage to the indi-
vidual and the moral fibre of the community results from lucid
2 365 U.S. 43, 69-73. "A revelation of the extent to which censorship has
recently been used in tlus country is indeed astonishing. The Chicago licensors
have banned newsreel films of Chicago policemen shooting at labor pickets and
have ordered the deletion of a scene depicting the birth of a buffalo in Walt
Disney s Vanishtng Prairie. Cavzer, Who Censors Our Movies? Chicago Mag-
azine, Feb. 1956, pp. 35, 39. Recently, Chicago refused to issue a permit for
the exhibition of the motion picture Anatomy of a Murder based upon the best-
selling novel of the same title, because it found the use of words "rape" and
"contraceptive" to be objectionable. Columbia Pictures Corp. v. City of Chicago,
D.C.N.D. Ill., 1919, 184 F 2d 817. The Chicago censor bureau excised a scene
in Street With No Name in which a girl was slapped because this was thought
to be a "too violent" episode, Life, Oct. 21, 1948, p. 60. The New York
censors banned Damaged Lives, a film dealing with venereal disease, although it
treated a difficult theme with dignity and has the sponsorship of the American
Social Hygiene Society. The picture of Leni s tomb bearing the inscription
"Religion is the opiate of the people" was excised from Potemkin. From Joan of
Arc the Maryland board eliminated Joan s exclamation as she stood at the stake:
"Oh, God, why has thou forsaken me?" and from Idiots Delight, the sentence:
"We the workers of the world, will take care of that." During the year
ending June 30, 1938, the New York board censored, in one way or another,
over five per cent of the moving pictures it reviewed. An early version of
Carmen was condemned on several different grounds. The Oio censor objected
because cigarette-girls smoked cigarettes in public. The Pennsylvama censor
disapproved the duration of a lass. The New York censors forbade the dis-
cussion in films of pregnancy, venereal disease, eugemcs, birth control, abortion,
illegitimacy, prostitution, miscegenation and divorce. Ernst and Lindey, supra,
at p. 83. A member of the Chicago censor board explained that she rejected
a film because "it was unmoral, corrupt, indecent, against my religious
principles." Transcript of Record, p. 172. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago,
244 F 2d 432. The police sergeant in charge of the censor unit has said:
"Children should be allowed to see any movie that plays in Chicago. If a picture
is objectionable for a child, it is objectionable period." Chicago Tribune, May
24, 1959, p. 8, col. 3. And this is but a smattering produced from limited re-
search. Perhaps the most powerful indictment of Chicago s licensing device is
found in the fact that between the Court's decision in 1952 in Joseph Burstyn,
Inc., v. Wilson, supra, and the filing of the petition for certiorari in 1960 in the
present case, not once have the state courts upheld the censor when the exhibitor
elected to appeal. Brief for American Civil Liberties Umon as amicus curiae,
pp. 13-14."
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portrayals of adultery and fornication with the implied or ex-
pressed message that such behavior is normal and socially de-
sirable. Consider the impressionable adolescent. It is somewhat
ironic, is it not, that the State protects him or her from every
conceivable danger by innumerable laws, expends tremendous
sums to educate and give opportunity for growth, and is virtually
powerless to regulate that which is quite likely to have the
greatest influence.
(3) These views do not carry into the area of political speech
where the considerations involved weigh heavily on the side of
free expression. It does not appear illogical to not equate a
publication advocating a change in the law of complaining of
injustice in the law with a "work of art" portraying in graphic
detail the intimate sex relations of human beings sunk or sink-
ing into a state of degradation. Free society cannot exist with-
out the former but can get along quite well without the latter.
(4) The writer has found that the most ardent champions
of unrestricted publication among his acquaintances waver in
their strong convictions when confronted with a concrete illus-
tration of some of our currently protected publications. Discus-
sions of this area in the abstract tend to be quite sterile. There
exists, moreover, the feeling that if one wishes to be considered
an intellectual and a modem man of the world, one must simply
oppose regulation of sex publications. Otherwise one may be
considered unrealistic, a prude, totally devoid of artistic and
literary appreciation and lacking understanding of life as it
really is.3 For these reasons descriptions of some of the publica-
tions held to be non-obscene in recent cases have been here in-
cluded. Without something tangible to refer to one simply
becomes immeshed in a quagmire of semantics.
In 1960, Professors William B. Lockhart and Robert Mc-
Clure published a very comprehensive, fully annotated 115 page
work on the subject of obscenity.4 The article, along with several
3 Note in this connection a four-part statement by Editor of Playboy Mag-
azine entitled, "The Playboy Philosophy," appearing in Playboy, Vol. 9, No. 12,
Vol. 10, Nos. 1, 2 and 3. The point is again emphasized by a recent solicitation
by the new publication 'Eros," received through the mail. On the envelope
appears the large slogan, 'Intellectuals Unite." The circular itself refers to recent
Supreme Court decisions, the liberation of the mind and the reaction of "prudes"
everywhere.4 Lockhart & McClure, Censorshtp of Obscenity: The Developing Constitu-
tional Standards, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 5 (1960).
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others, 5 is obviously the product of careful research and thought
and certainly covers the law up to 1960. They will be referred
to frequently herein, but no attempt is made to cover the same
ground. Rather, the emphasis will be on analyzing several re-
cent United States Supreme Court decisions and to showing that
from a legal aspect the issue of regulation or censorship of
allegedly obscene publications has been quietly resolved.
In essence it is the thesis there that the Roth case,6 hailed
as a victory by proponents of censorship, is just the opposite of
what it appears to be and that the principles there propounded
have resulted in virtual, if not complete, immunity for the ob-
scene and pornographic. This has come about by virtue (1)
of the subsequent interpretation and application of the verbal
formula of the Roth case; and (2) the procedural limitations im-
posed by the Court.
Interpretation and Application
The rules of law formulated in the Roth case are quite easily
stated. Publications dealing with sex are protected against inter-
ference by the federal government by the first amendment and
against state action by the fourteenth amendment, providing
only the publication has "some redeeming social importance."
Obscene and porongraphic publications have utterly no redeem-
ing social importance and therefore, along with slander, libel, s
group libel9 and "fighting words," 1 are not free spceech and may
be regulated and prohibited. The test of obscenity is "whether to
the average person, applying contemporary community stand-
ards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole ap-
peals to prurient interest."i"
Two dissenters, Justices Douglas and Black, would apply the
5Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity, and the Consti-
tution, 38 Minn. L. Rev. 295 (1954)" Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity Censorship:
The Core Constitutional Issue-What Is Obscene?, 7 Utah L. Rev. 289 (1961).6 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), reversing 237 F 2d 796
(2d Cir. 1956); Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476, reverstng 138 Cal. App. 2d
909, 292 P. 2d 90 (1955). These decisions are thoroughly analyzed in Lockhart
& McClure, supra note 4.
7Roth v. United States, supra note 6, at 484.8 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
9Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
1o Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
11 Roth v. United States, supra note 6, at 489.
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clear and present danger test to the area.12 Mr. Justice Harlan
dissented in part and concurred in part. He would apply dif-
ferent standards to federal and state regulations.'8 Moreover,
he objected both to the verbal formula of the majority and the
fact that even attempted to formulate broad principles. Mr.
Chief Justice Warren concurred on the basis of the facts before
the Court, but would attach considerable significance to the
intent of the purveyor.14
The principles enunciated in this case have engendered much
speculation, confusion, and criticism. Some of the unanswered
questions, without lengthy elaboration, include the following:
1. Who is the average person and how and by whom is his
identity and characteristics to be determined?15
1
2 1t appears to be conceded that there exists little concrete evidence of any
connection between obscenity and overt acts. See Lockhart & McClure, supra
note 4, at 57. Presumably if the circulation in a community of the novel Lady
Chatterley s Lover were followed by a 100 per cent increase in adulterous
relations a good case of clear and present danger of a grave and substantive evil
might be established. This is obviously idle speculation as there is little likeli-
hood that such quantum of proof will ever be available in obscenity cases. The
effect of this test as applied to obscene publications would clearly result in com-
plete immunity. Mr. Justice Black particularly has consistently maintained this
position.
I3 Mr. Justice Harlan s seeming vacillation in cases following Roth can per-
haps be explained to some extent by the different approach taken toward state
and federal regulation of publications. He voted to reverse the federal convic-
tion in Roth and to affirm the state conviction in Alberts. In Smith v. California,
361 U.S. 147 (1960), he disagreed with the Court's rationale an reversing a state
conviction of a bookseller, although concurring in the result because of the
exclusion of relevant evidence. In Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960), he
dissented when a state conviction for violating a mumcipal ordinance requiring
disclosure of a publisher s identity was reversed. In Times Film Corp. v. City
of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961), he joined the majority in upholding the validity
of a liceusing requirement for motion picture films. He was the only dissenter
n Bantam Books, Inc., v. Sullivan, 81 S.Ct. 631 (1963), where the Court en-
joined the activity of a state agency curtailing free distribution. Yet it was Jus-
tice Harlan who wrote the opinon in Manuel Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478
(1962), striking down an administrative order of the Post Office Department and
severely restricting federal obscenity regulation. (All these decisions are discussed
tnfra.)
14 This approach has not been adopted an any subsequent decision and was
impliedly rejected n Manuel Enterprises v. Day, supra note 13. The definition
of pornography often includes the black market for underworld character of the
traffic therein. See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 4, at 61, particularly notes
340-42. This element of the definition appears to be of dubious validity. Pre-
sumably pornography went underground because believed to be illegal. If held
protected by the Constitution it may very well come out in the open.
15 Discussed in Lockhart & McClure, supra note 4, at 70-73. The authors refer
to Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 218 Mass. 543, 62 N.E. 2d 840 (1945), where
the average man is described as a composite of all elements of society, including
the young and susceptible, and United States v. One Book Called Ulysses, 5 F
Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 72 F 2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934), where he is re-
(Continued on next page)
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2. What is the contemporary community?16 Is is to be broken
down geographically, by age, by social standing in the com-
munity, educational achievements?
3. What is meant by the "dominant theme?" 17 If the pro-
fessed intention of the publisher is to show life as he believes it
really is or show the desirability of free love, will this dominant
theme justify anything and everything written or pictured?
4. What is meant by prurient interest? Dictionary defirn-
nitions are likely to be of little assistance. One that the writer con-
sulted led him in a rather circular path.18 Obscenity is character-
ized as appeal to the prurient interest which means interest in-
clined or characterized by obscene thought. Pornography is de-
fined as "obscene literature or art."
5. If the publication is concededly obscene, however this
is arrived at, will it nevertheless be protected if it has literary or
artistic merit and/or redeeming social importance?19
6. Should or does the intent of the purveyor have any sig-
nificance?
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
ferred to as a "person with average sex instincts." Id. at 84. Professors Lockhart
and McClure indicate that probably this terminology is employed to distinguish
older cases using the young and susceptible to judge the impact of the pub-
lication.
16 See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 4, at 108-14, and the quoted portion
of Manuel Enterprises v. Day, znfra p. 620. Whatever this test does mean it appar-
ently does not refer to the feeling or standards in a particular community. Note
the difficulty inherent in instructing a jury compnsed of primarily rural inhabi-
tants on what "contemporary community standards" are. The writer would be
somewhat reluctant to try and convince an east Texas jury that recently upheld
publications comport to the standards of that or any other community. Mr.
Justice Harlan possibly had this problem in mind in Ins opinion in Roth wherein
he objected to the formulation of broad prmciples. He expresses distrust of what
results juries might reach in obscenity cases being the Roth formula. Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 497-98 (1957).
17 Discussed in Lockhart & McClure, supra note 4, at 88-95. The authors
refer to any effort by the Court to judge the necessity of objectionable phrases
or parts of a publication as putting "courts in the silly position of instructing
authors how to write their books." Id. at 94.1 8 Barnhart, The American College Dictionary (1949).19 Lockhart & McClure, supra note 4, at 95-99. The authors conclusions
are summed up as follows:
Yet, wnchever of the two competing concepts of obscenity ulti-
mately prevails, we are convinced that material of redeeming social
importance is not obscene and is entitled to constitutional protec-
tion-at least in those circumstances in which the material has social
value for its primary audience. This much seems very clear at the
present stage m the development of constitutional standards gov-
ermng obscenity censorship. But the means for determining whether
material has social value and, if so, the weight to be accorded it,
are not yet at all clear. And these are crucial problems, for it is
(Continued on next page)
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7 Should the material be judged on its face or on its as-
sumed impact on the mind or its potential for encouraging overt
acts of misconduct or a combination of all these?
8. Should the nature of the primary target be determinative
or have any significance whatsoever or should the criterion in all
cases be the judgment of, effect on or propensity toward danger
to the hypothetical average man?
9. By whom and how are all these matters to be determined
in the case of a specific publication?
That these are knotty questions which quite possibly cannot
be satisfactorily answered can hardly be denied. After fifty-two
pages of careful analysis Messrs. Lockhart and McClure emerged
with the following statement:
We are driven to the conclusion that the verbal formula
for obscenity approved by the Court in the Roth-Alberts
opinion is not a single formula at all but one that em-
braces all of the current definitions of obscenity, mclud-
ing that of the Model Penal Code. Any of these verbal
formulas may be constitutionally acceptible as a defini-
tion of "obscenity," since none of them judges material
by the effect of isolated passages on particularly suscep-
tible persons. So we are left in the unhappy position of
the delegates to the Geneva Conference on the Suppres-
sion of the Circulation and Traffic in Obscene Publica-
tions, who discovered that they could not define obscenity,
"after which, having triumphantly asserted that they did
not know what they were talking about, the members of
the Congress settled down to their discussion." We know
only that material tested for obscenity must be judged as a
whole instead of by its parts and by its appeal to or effect
upon average persons instead of the weak and susceptible.
But of what it is that must be judged m this fashion, we
know little save that it deal with sex in any of its many
manifestations.2 0
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
easier to say that we will respect and protect material of redeeming
social importance than it is to do so in practice. This is particularly
true of works of art, because many people-mcluding some police and
prosecuting officers, and sometimes judges too-do not understand
or appreciate them. These people neither know nor understand how
the fine arts-including drama, fiction, poetry, dancing, and even
music-are vehicles for the communication of ideas. Consequently,
some way must be found to assure that in all obscenity cases the
value of the material is first of all considered and then given its
proper weight in arving at a decision on the obscenity of material.2 0 Lockhart & McClure, supra note 4, at 58.
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Following the Roth case, the 1957 term of the Supreme Court
per curiam reversed four cases wherein censorship was upheld.21
The Game of Love is described by the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals as follows:
[A] 16 year old boy is shown completely nude on a bath-
ng beach in the presence of a group of younger girls [as
a result of a boating accident]. On that plane the narra-
tive proceeds to reveal the seduction of this boy by a
physically attractive woman old enough to be his mother.
Under the influence of this experience and an arrange-
ment to repeat it, the boy thereupon engages in sexual
relations with a girl of his own age. The erotic thread of
the story is carried, without deviation toward any whole-
some idea, through scene after scene. The narrative is
graphically pictured with nothing omitted except those
sexual consummations which are plainly suggested but
meaningfully omitted and thus, by the very fact of omis-
sion, emphasized. 22
The other cases involve publications which are in some re-
spect more vile and despicable and will not be described here.
The French motion picture "Lady Chatterley's Lover" was
involved in Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v Regents of
the University of New York.23 The censor had objected to the
film because its "whole theme is immoral the presentation
of adultery as a desirable, acceptable and proper pattern of be-
havior"24 and because of certain scenes showing the gamekeeper
and Lady Chatterley together in bed, undressed, the gamekeeper
carressing the Lady's buttock, unzipping her dress and carressmg
her bare back. The dialogue accompanying these scenes was ap-
propriate to the acts taking place.
The New York Court of Appeals held the picture to be
non-obscene but upheld the censor's ban because it "alluringly
portrayed adultery as proper behavior."25 The United States
Supreme Court reversed. Six opinions were written, differing
21 Times Film Corp. v. City of Clucago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957), reversing 244
F 2d 432 (7th Cir. 1957); Mounce v. United States, 355 U.S. 180 (1958),
reversing 247 F 2d 148 (9th Cir. 1957); One, Inc., v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371(1958), reversing 241 F 2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957); Sunshine Book Co. v. Sum-
merfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958), reversng 249 F 2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957).22 Times Film Corp. v. City of Cucago, 244 F 2d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 1957).
23360 U.S. 684 (1959), reversing 175 N.Y.S. 2d 39, 151 N.E. 2d 197 (1958).
241d. at 687.
25lind.
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only slightly in approach. The majority opinion by Mr. Justice
Stewart stressed that the censors act denying the freedom to
advocate ideas "struck at the very heart of constitutionally pro-
tected liberty."26 The decision marks the end of censorship of
"idealogical obscenity" according to Lockhart and McClure.27
Apparently all nine justices concurred in the conclusion that the
film was not otherwise obscene, although this question was not
directly before the Court.
There have been a number of state and lower federal court
decisions after Kingsley Pictures, but the two cases discussed
above suffice to illustrate a point the writer wished to make here.
As between the rawest of hard core pornography and the two
motion pictures discussed above, which is most likely to appeal
to the prurient interest of the average adult? Which will tend
to incite lustful thoughts, to corrupt or deprave, to result in sexual
gratification? It appears to be generally conceded that to the
average person pornography is repulsive and that only the ab-
normal or immature find prurient interest appeal theren. 28
Because of their very susceptibility, however, the impact on these
persons may not be used as a criterion for judging the material.
If this reasoning is followed to its logical extreme the more re-
pulsive the publication the less likely it can be regulated. This
same conclusion is tentatively reached by Lockhart and McClure
but they untie the knot by advocating a "variable" as opposed
261d. at 688.
It is contended that the State s action was justified because the
motion picture attractively portrays a relationship which is contrary
to the moral standards, the religious precepts, and the legal code
of its citizenry. This argument disconceives what it is that the Con-
stitution protects. Its guarantee is not confined to the expression of
ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority. It protects ad-
vocacy of the opimon that adultery may sometimes be proper, no
less than advocacy of socialism or the single tax. And in the real
of ideas it protects expression which is eloquent no less than that
which is unconvincing.27Lockhart & McClure, supra note 4, at 39-43, 99-103. Note that the Court
in the Kingsley case did not hold that the manner of portraying the material
was protected under this approach, but only the freedom to advocate ideas.
This point is empihasized by Professors Lockhart and McClure. Id. at 102.
Nevertheless the dominant theme" requirement together with the freedom of
the publisher to advance his dominant theme as appears best to him (see note
17, supra) would appear to confer broad immunity both on the advocacy of
the idea and the method of portrayal. Certain passages in Lady Chatterleys
Lover best illustrate the point but, perhaps unfortunately, the court in Kings-
ley was not presented with the issue of whether these passages were obscene
or not.28 Lockhart & McClure, supra note 4, at 56-58.
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to a constant standard of obscenity 29 Thus the test would depend
to some extent on the nature of the market, i.e., adolescents,
homosexuals, etc.
The decision in Manuel Enterprises v Day"0 appears to retie
the knot tighter than ever. It should be emphasized at the outset
that this case involves the interpretation of "obscenity" m a fed-
eral statutes' and that the "majority opinion" by Mr. Justice
Harlan is concurred in by only one Justice.32 Mr. Justice Black
simply concurred in the result and Justices Brennan, Douglas,
and Mr. Chief Justice Warren, went off on another ground.
Nevertheless, none except the dissenter, Mr. Justice Clark, seem-
ed to disagree with Justice Harlan s opinion and analysis.
The case involved a ruling of the Post Office Department
barring certain magazines from the mails on the basis they were
themselves obscene and also gave information where obscene
matter could be obtained. The government described the pub-
lications as follows:
The magazine contained little textual material, with
pictures of male models dominating almost every page.
The typical page consisted of a photograph, with the
name of the model and the photographer and occasional
references to the model's age (usually under 26), color
of eyes, physical dimensions and occupation. The mag-
azines contained little, either in text or in pictures, that
could be considered as relating in any way to weight lift-
ing, muscle building or physical culture.
Many of the photographs were of nude male models,
usually posed with some object in front of their genitals
, a number were of nude or partially nude males with
29 Id. at 68. "We are left, then, in a quandry. Hard-core pornography,
which appeals only to the sexually immature, is clearly obscene, but by the
Court's definition obscene material is material that appeals to the prurient
interest of the average person-for whom hard-core pornography holds little
attraction."
The authors discuss and analyze the advantages and disadvantages of a van-
able obscenity standard as opposed to a constant standard which ignores the pri-
mary audience or the conduct of the surveyor. Id at 68-88. They indicate that
up to that time the Supreme Court had not passed upon the question, but that
several lower courts had adopted a variable obscenity standard. Cases cited
include United States v. 31 Photographs, 156 F Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)
(The Kinsey report); Matthews v. Florida, 99 So. 2d 568 (1951), cert. den:ed
356 U.S. 918 (1958) (Conviction for exhibiting obscene pictures to twelve-
year-olds).80370 U.S. 478 (1962), reversing 289 F 2d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
3118 U.S.C. §1461 (1958).
32 Mr. Justice Stewart.
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emphasis on their bare buttocks. Although none of the
pictures directly exposed the moders genitals, some showed
his public hair and others suggested what appeared to be
a semi-erect penis , others showed male models re-
clining with their legs [and sometimes their arms as well]
spread wide apart. Many of the pictures showed
models wearing only loin cloths, "V gowns," or posing
straps , some showed the model apparently removing
his clothing. Two of the magazines had pictures of
pairs of models posed together suggestively.
Each of the magazines contained photographs of models
with swords or other long pointed objects. The mag-
azmes also contained photographs of virtually nude models
wearing only shoes, boots, helmets or leather jackets.
There were also pictures of models posed with chains or
of one model beating another while a third held his face
in his hands as if weeping. 33
Because of the possible importance of this decision to the
subject matter of this article, liberal portions of that part of the
opinion dealing with obscenity are here reprinted (emphasis
mine).
On the issue of obscenity, as distinguished from un-
lawful advertising, the case comes to us with the follow-
mg administrative findings, which are supported by sub-
stantial evidence and which we, and indeed the parties,
for the most part, themselves, accept: (1) the magazines
are not, as asserted by petitioners, physical culture or
"body-building" publications, but are composed primarily,
if not exclusively, for homosexuals, and have no literary,
scienitfic or other merit; (2) they would appeal to the
"prurient interest" of such sexual deviates, but would not
have any interest for sexually normal individuals; and (3)
the magazines are read almost entirely by homosexuals,
and possibly a few adolescent males; the ordinary male
adult would not normally buy them.
On these premises, the question whether these mag-
azines are "obscene," as it was decided below and argued
before us, was thought to depend solely on a determination
as to the relevant "audience" in terms of which their
"prurient interest" appeal should be judged. This view of
the obscenity issue evidently stemmed from the belief
that in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489, this Court
established the following single test for determining whether
83 Manuel Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 at 489, n.13.
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challenged material is obscene: "Whether to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals
to prurient interest." On this basis the Court of Appeals,
rejecting the petitioners contention that the "prurient in-
terest" appeal of the magazines should be judged in terms
of their likely impact on the "average person," even though
not a likely recipient of the magazines, held that the ad-
mmistrative finding respecting their impact on the "aver-
age homosexual" sufficed to establsh the Government's case
as to their obscenity
We do not reach the question thus thought below to be
dispositive on this aspect of the case. For we find lack-
mg in these magazines an element which, no less than
"prurient interest," is essential to a valid determination
of obscenity under Sec. 1461, and to which neither the
Post Office Department nor the Court of Appeals ad-
dressed itself at all: These magazines cannot be deemed
so offensive on their face as to affront current community
standards of decency-a quality that we shall hereafter refer
to as "patent offensiveness" or "indecency" Lacking that
quality, the magazines cannot be deemed legally "ob-
scene," and we need not consider the question of the proper
"audience by which their "prurient interest" appeal should
be judged.
Obscenity under the federal statute thus requires proof
of two distince elements: (1) patent offensiveness; and (2)
"prurient interest" appeal. Both must conjoin before chal-
lenged material can be found "obscene" under Sec. 1461.
In most obscenity cases, to be sure, the two elements tend
to coalesce, for that which is patently offensave will also
usually carry the requisite "prurient interest" appeal. It is
only in the unusual instance where, as here, the "prurient
interest" appeal of the material is found limited to a par-
ticular class of persons that occasion arises for a truly
independent inquiry into the question whether or not the
material is patently offensive.
The Court of Appeals was mistaken in considering that
Roth made "prurient interest" appeal the sole test of ob-
scenity Reading that case as dispensing with the requisite
of patently offensive portrayal would be not only incon-
sistent with See. 1461 and its common-law background,
but out of keeping with Roths evident purpose to tighten
obscenity standards. The Court there both rejected the
"isolated excerpt" and "particularly susceptible persons"
tests of the Hickin case, 854 U.S. at 488-489, and was at
pains to point out that not all portrayals of sex could be
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reached by obscenity laws but only those treating that
subject "in a manner appealing to prurient interest." 354
U.S. at 487. That, of course, was but a compendious way
of embracing in the obscenity standard both the concept of
patent offensiveness, manifested by the terms of Sec. 1461
itself, and the element of the likely corruptive effect of the
challenged material, brought into federal law, via Regina
It is only material whose indecency is self-demon-
strating and which, from the standpoint of its effect, may
v. Hicklin.
be said predominantly to appeal to the prurient interest
that Congress has chosen to bar from the mails by the force
of Sec. 1461.
There must first be decided the relevant "community"
m terms of whose standards of decency the issue must be
judged. We think that the proper test under this federal
statute, reaching as it does to all parts of the United
States whose population reflects many different ethmc
and cultural backgrounds, is a national standard of de-
cency. We need not decide whether Congress could con-
stitutionally prescribe a lesser geographical framework for
judging this issue which would not have the intolerable
consequence of denying some sections of the country access
to material, there deemed acceptable, which in others
might be considered offensive to prevailing community
standards of decency Cf. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S.
380.
Whether "hard core" pornography, or something less,
be the proper test, we need go no further in the present
case than to hold that the magazines in question, taken
as a whole, cannot, under any permissible constitutional
standard, be deemed to be beyond the pale of contem-
porary notions of rudimentary decency.
We cannot accept in full the Government's description
of these magazines which, contrary to Roth (354 U.S. at
488-489), tends to emphasize and in some respects over-
draw certain features in several of the photographs, at
the expense of what the magazines fairly taken as a whole
depict. Our own independent examination of the mag-
azines leads us to conclude that the most that can be
said of them is that they are dismally unpleasant, uncouth,
and tawdry But this is not enough to make them "ob-
scene." Divorced from their "prurient interest" appeal to
the unfortunate persons whose patronage they were aimed
at capturing (a separate issue), these portrayals of the male
nude cannot fairly be regarded as more objectionable than
many portrayals of the female nude that society tolerates.
1963]
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Of course not every portrayal of male or female nudity is
obscene. s4
Note that the Court neither rejects nor adopts a shifting or
variable obscenity test. One can understand the reluctance of the
"majority" to, in effect, require submission to a jury the ques-
tion of whether a particular publication appeals to the "prurient
interest" of the average homosexual. Note also the statement
that usually the elements of "patent offensiveness" and "prurient
interest" appeal "will tend to coalesce." As pointed out above,
just the contrary would appear to be the case.3 5 If the publica-
tion is "patently offensive" it has no "prurient interest" appeal
to the average person. If it has "prurient interest" appeal to
the average person it most likely will not be "patently offensive"
and, moreover, probably has literary or artistic value.
Thus, assuming the majority of the Court will go along with
Mr. Justice Harlan's refinement of the Roth verbal formula and
it will be applied to all sex publication cases, there emerges a
test for obscenity which, if literally applied, renders everything
that is published non-obscene.30
Should this conclusion be erroneous, or should the majority
of the Court reject Mr. Justice Harlan's interpretation or nar-
rowly confine it to the specific statute, there still exists consider-
able doubt as to whether any publication will be found ob-
scene and thus unprotected. First of all it is clearly evident that
the Court as a whole is not easily shocked or offended. The
"average person" is going to have to be extremely broadminded.
Since no recent Supreme Court case has actually upheld a find-
ing of obscenity, there is really yet no indication of just how
broadminded he must be.
In any event, "ideological obscenity" is apparently immune
to censorship.3 7 A non-obscene "dominant theme" may and prob-
ably will protect the body of the publication. These two prm-
s4Id. at 481-489.3 5 See note 29 supra.
36 The reader should not he misled by this statement. Mr. justice Harlan
did not, it is emphasized, state that the language used was to be applicable to
all obscenity litigations, nor did he indicate any desire or intent to inmunize
pornography. Moreover, the opinion could be a reflection of his attitude toward
federal censorship. See note 13 supra.
37 See note 27 supra.
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ciples are obviously closely intertwined and anyone possessing
a normal imagination should be able to see the possibilities here.
In light of what the Court has both said and done since
the decision in the Roth case, is it unwarranted to conclude that
the decision has been tacitly overruled? Note also that the make-
up of the Court has changed considerably and that all the dis-
senters or near dissenters remain.38
of procedural limitations.
Procedural Limitations
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court dealing
with the validity of procedures utilized to control obscene pub-
lications are Smith v. California,9 Times Film Corp. v. City of
Chicago,40 Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property,41 Manuel En-
terprises v. Day,42 and Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan.43 Some-
what indirectly involved is Talley v. California.44
In the Smith case 45 the Court reversed the conviction of a
bookseller for violating a municipal ordinance which made it
unlawful "for any person to have in his possession any obscene
writing (or) book in any place of business where books
are sold or kept for sale." 46 The majority opinion by Mr.
Jusitce Brennan held the ordinance invalid because there was
no requirement that the state show "knowledge by appellant of
the contents of the book-and thus the ordinance was construed
as imposing a 'strict' or absolute' criminal liability."47 The
Court stressed that the absence of the scienter requirement would
severely hamper the bookseller since he will be reluctant to sell
anything he hasn't read. The result would be to restrict the
88 Gone from the Court are Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker. Mr. Chief
Justice Warren and Justices Black and Douglas appear to form a hard core of
opposition against regulation of sex publications. The defendant m a censorship
case therefore starts out with the score 3-0 in his favor.
Further commentary will be deferred until after the analysis
s9361 U.S. 147 (1959), reversng 161 Cal. App. 2d 860, 327 P. 2d 636(1958).(5k58 U.S. 43 (1960).
41367 U.S. 717 (1961), reversng 334 S.W 2d 119 (1961).
42370 U.S. 478 (1962).
483 Sup. Ct. 631 (1963), reversng 176 A. 2d 393 (1961).
44362 U.S. 60 (1960), reversing 332 P. 2d 447 (1958).45 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).46 Id. at 216.
47 Id. at 149.
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dissemination of both obscene and constitutionally protected
publications.
The booksellers limitation in the amount of reading ma-
terial with which he could familiarize himself, and his
timidity in the face of his absolute crimnal liability, thus
would tend to restrict the public s access to forms of the
printed word which the State could not constitutionally
suppress directly The booksellers self-censorship, com-
pelled by the State, would be a censorship affecting the
whole public, hardly less virulent for being privately ad-
ministered. Through it, the distribution of all books, both
obscene and not obscene, would be impeded.48
The Court refused to formulate any general rules with respect
to the burden of proof the state must meet.
We need not and most definitely do not pass today on
what sort of mental element is requisite to a constitu-
tionally permissible prosecution of a bookseller for carry-
mg an obscene book in stock; whether honest mistake
as to whether its contents in fact constituted obscenity
need be an excuse; whether there might be circumstances
under which the State constitutionally might require that
a bookseller investigate further, or might put on him the
burden of explaining why he did not, and what such
circumstances might be. Doubtless any form of crim-
inal obscenity statute applicable to a bookseller will in-
duce some tendency to self-censorshp and have some
inhibitory effect on the dissemination of material not ob-
scene, but we consider today only one which goes to the
extent of eliminating all mental elements from the crme.49
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter objected
to "doctrinaire absolutism" that would "nullify for all practical
purposes the power of the State to deal with obscenity." 590 Quite
probably he was referring to the separate concurring opinions of
Justices Black and Douglas. Moreover, he felt the Court should
give some guidance on the important issue of how much proof
will suffice to establish scienter. He assumes that the majority
opinion does not mean that actual reading of the publication
must be shown in order to hold a bookseller responsible.
48Id. at 153-54.
49 Id. at 154-55.
5od. at 163-64,
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No less obviously, the Court does not hold that a book-
seller who insulates himself against knowledge about an
offending book is thereby free to maintain an emporium
for smut. How much or how little awareness that a book
may be found to be obscene suffices to establish scienter,
or what kind of evidence may satisfy the how much or
the how little, the Court leaves for another day5l
Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in the reversal because the trial
judge excluded evidence relevant to the issue of obscenity. He
dissented from the rationale of the majority opinion.52
Justices Black and Douglas both wrote concurring opinions.
Mr. Justice Black criticized the majority view for implying that
a bookseller could be punished for knowingly selling obscene
publications. He restated his opinion that the first amendment's
prohibitions against abridging freedom of expression are abso-
lute and, presumably, embraces obscene and pornographic ex-
pression. Mr. Justice Douglas likewise reiterates the position
he took in the Roth case.
Talley v. Californza53 is involved here only tangentially The
case deals with the validity of a municipal ordinance requiring
that handbills contain the name and address of the publisher as
applied to a handbill urging a boycott of certain named merch-
ants and businessmen because they did not offer equal employ-
ment opportunities to Negroes, Mexicans and Orientals. Mr.
Justice Black wrote the majority opinion reversing the convic-
tions based on this ordinance.
There can be no doubt that such an identification re-
quirement would tend to restrict freedom to distribute in-
formation and thereby freedom of expression. "Liberty
of circulating is as essential to that freedom as liberty
of publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the publi-
51id. at 161.
52 Id. at 169-70.
The striking down of local legislation is always serious business
for this Court. In my opinion in the Roth case I expressed the
view that state power in the obscenity field has a wider scope than
federal power. In my view then, the satenter question involves
considerations of a different order depending on whether a state or
a federal statute is involved. We have here a state ordinance, and
on the meagre data before us I would not reach the question whether
the absence of a sctenter element renders the ordinance unconsti-
tutional. I must say, however, the generalities in the Court's opinion
striking down the ordinance leave me unconvinced,
53362 U.S. 60 (1960).
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cation would be of little value." Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. at
452.
Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even
books have played an important role m the progress of
mankind. Persecuted groups and sects from time to time
throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive
practices and laws either anonymously or not at all. 4
The dissenters reject this "freedom of anonymity" 55 and
point to the numerous federal statutes requiring disclosure of the
identity of publishers, lobbyists and distributors of political cam-
paign literature. The public interest in preventing fraud, libel,
false advertising, etc., is also alluded to. There was, moreover,
absolutely no evidence that disclosure here would have resulted
in any injury.
The reason for including this decision here should be appar-
ent. If the publisher of material which is likely to be libelous
has the right to anonymity the same principle should apply to
the publisher to material probably obscene and pornographic.
Thus if the publisher of pornography does not desire to be
identified with his product he has the constitutional right to this
anonymity. Of course, the Talley case did not involve obscene
publications but what basis is there for drawing a distinction
between obscenity and libel?
In Marcus v. Search Warrants8 the Court unanimously held
invalid a statutory procedure of the State of Missouri described
by the Court as follows:
This appeal presents the question whether due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment was demed the appel-
lants by the application in this case of Missouri's pro-
cedures authorizing the search for and seizure of allegedly
obscene publications preliminarily to their destruction by
burning or otherwise if found by a court to be obscene.
The procedures are statutory, but are supplemented by
a rule of the Missouri Supreme Court. The warrant for
search for and seizure of obscene material issues on a
sworn complaint filed with a judge or magistrate. If the
complainant states "positively and not upon information
or belief," or states "evidential facts from which such judge
54Id. at 64.
55 Id. at 70. The dissenters m tlns case were Justices Clark Frankfurter
and Whittaker.
56367 U.S. 717 (1961).
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or magistrate determines the existence of probably cause"
to believe that obscene material "is being held or kept in
any place or in any building," "such judge or magistrate
shall issue a search warrant directed to any peace officer
commanding hun to search the place therein described
and to seize and bring before such judge or magistrate the
personal property therein described." The owner of the
property is not afforded a hearing before the warrant
issues; the proceeding is ex parte. However, the judge or
magistrate issung the warrant must fix a date, not less
than five nor more than 20 days after the seizure, for a
hearing to determine whether the seized material is ob-
scene. The owner of the material may appear at such
hearing and defend against the charge. No time limit is
provided within which the judge must announce his de-
cision. If the judge finds that the material is obscene, he is
required to order it to be publicly destroyed, by burning
or otherwise; if he finds that it is not obscene, he shall
order its return to its owner.57
First there is the almost inevitable discussion of Old English
Star Chamber procedures. The Court then proceeded to strike
down the Missouri procedure with little fanfare:
We believe that Missouri's procedures as applied in
this case lacked the safeguards which due process demands
to assure non-obscene material the constitutional protec-
tion to which it is entitled. Putting to one side the fact
that no opportunity was afforded the appellants to elicit
and contest the reasons for the officers belief, or other-
wise to argue against the propriety of the seizure to the
issuing judge, still the warrants issued on the strength
of the conclusory assertions of a single police officer, with-
out any scrutiny by the judge of any materials considered
by the complainant to be obscene. The warrants gave the
broadest discretion to the executing officers; they merely
repeated the language of the statute and the complaints
specified no publications, and left to the individual judg-
ment of each of the many police officers involved the
selection of such magazines as in his view constituted
"obscene publications." So far as appears from the
record none of the officers except Lieutenant Coughlin
had previously examined any of the publications which
were subsequently seized. It is plain that in many in-
stances, if not in all, each officer actually made ad hoc
57 Id. at 718-21.
KENTUcKY LAW JouRNAL
decisions on the spot and, gauged by the number of pub-
lications seized and the time spent m executing the war-
rants, each decision was made with little opportunity
for reflection and deliberation. As to publications seized
because they appeared on the Lieutenant's list, we know
nothing of the basis for the original judgment that they
were obscene. It is no reection on the good faith orjudgment of the officers to conclude that the task they
were assigned was simply an impossible one to perform
with any realistic expectation that the obscene might be
accurately separated from the constitutionally protected.
They were provided with no guide to the exercise of m-
formed discretion, because there was no step m the
procedure before seizure designed to focus searchingly
on the question of obscenity See generally 1 Chaffee,
Government and Mass Communications, pp. 200-218. In
consequence there were suppressed and withheld from the
market for over two months 180 publications not found
obscene. The fact that only one-third of the publica-
tions seized were finally condemned strengthens the con-
clusion that discretion to seize allegedly obscene ma-
terials cannot be confined to law neforcement officials
without greater safeguards than were here operative.
Procedures which sweep so broadly and with so little
discrimiation are obviously deficient m techniques re-
quired by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to prevent erosion of the constitutional guar-
antees.58
In the course of the opinion the Court commented that the
distributor's stock of magazines runs "in hundreds of thousands
probably closer to a million copies." 59 In light of the decision
in Smith v. Californa69 the distributor in this case would appear
virtually immune to prosecution for possession or sale of obscene
publications. How could the state possibly prove he had knowl-
edge of the contents of all these publications?
Manuel Enterprises v. Day6l has already been discussed with
respect to the definition of obscenity contained therein. Also
involved in that litigation was the advertising contained in the
magazines allegedly giving information where obscene matter
could be obtained. In this connection the Court imposed a
5 Id. at 131-83.
59 Id. at 722.
60 See notes 45-52 supra and accompanying text.
61370 U.S. 478 (1962). See notes 30-36 supra and accompanying text.
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scienter requirement even stricter than that required to charge
booksellers with responsibility. Based on the facts of this case
one could conclude the burden of proof is impossible to meet.
As pointed out in Mr. Justice Clark's dissent, the petitioners must
have known of the nature of the advertisement. 62 A stronger
case could hardly be imagined, assuming the advertiser did not
expressly state "pornography for sale."
Regulation by the Post Office Department in this area was
dealt a seemingly fatal blow by the concurring opinion in this
same case.
Questions of procedural safeguards loom large m the
wake of an order such as the one before us. Among them
are: (a) whether Congress can close the mails to ob-
621d. at 526-28.
The content and direction of the magazines themselves are a tip-off
as to the nature of the business of those who solicit through them.
The advertisements and photographer lists in such magazines were
quite naturally "designed so as to attract the male homosexual and
to furmsh hm with names and addresses where nude male pictures
in poses and conditions which would appeal to his prurient interest
may be obtained." Moreover, the advertisements themselves could
leave no more doubt in the publishers minds than in those of the
solicited purchasers. To illustrate: some captioned a picture of a
nude or scantily attired young man with the legend "perfectly pro-
portioned, handsome, male models, age 18-26." Others featured a
photograph of a nude male with the privates obviously retouched so
as to cover the genitals and part of the pubic hair and offered to
furmsh an "original print of this photo.' Finally, each magazine
specifically endorsed its listed photographers and requested its readers
to support them by purchasing their products. In addition, three of
the four magazines involved expressly represented that they were
familiar with the work of the photographers listed in their publications.
Turaing to Womack, the president and directing force of all three
corporate publishers, it Is even clearer that we are not dealing herewith a "Jack and Jill" operation. Mr. Womack admitted that themagazines were planned for homosexuals, designed to appeal to and
stimulate their erotic interests. To improve on tis effect, he made
suggestions to the photographers as to the type of pictures 
he wante .For example, he informed on  ofthe studios listed in is publications
that "physique fans want their truck driver types already 
cleaned
up, showered, and ready for bed Eand] it is absolutely essentialthat the models have pretty faces and a personality not totally un-
related to sex appeal.' Womack had also suggested to the pho-
tographers that they exchange customer names with the hope of
compiling a master list of homosexuals. He himnself had been con-icted of selling obscene photographs via the mails. Further-
more, he was warned in March, April, and July of 1959 that a
number of his photographer advertisers were being prosecuted for
mailing obscene matter and that he nnht be violating the law in
transmitting through the mails their advertisements. Finally,through another controlled corporation not here involved, he filled
orders for one ofahs advertisers sent in by the readers of has mag-
azines. This material was found to be obscene and like all of the
above facts and findings it is not contested here.
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scenity by any means other than prosecution of its sender;
(b) whether Congress, if it can authorize exclusion of
mail, can provide that obscenity be determined m the first
instance in any forum except a court, and (c) whether,
even if Congress could so authorize administrative cen-
sorship, it has in fact conferred upon postal authorities
any power to exclude matter from the mails upon their
determination of its obscene character.63
Although the concurring justices actually only decided that
Congress had not given the Department authority to censor the
mails they most emphatically expressed grave doubt over the
validity of such procedure even if expressly authorized. Mr.
Justice Clark stated this rather succinctly-
While those in the majority like ancient Gaul are split
into three parts, the ultimate holding of the Court today,
despite, the clear congressional mandate found in §1461,
requires the United States Post Office to be the world's
largest disseminator of smut and Grand Informer of the
names and places where obscene material may be ob-
tamed. The Judicial Officer of the Post Office Depart-
ment, the District Court, and the Court of Appeals have
all found the magazines in issue to be nonmailable on the
alternative grounds that they are obscene and they con-
tam information on where obscene material may be ob-
tamed.64
In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan 5 the activities of the Rhode-
Island Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth were held
unconstitutional in part and enjoined. The Commission's duties
consisted of educating "the public concerning any book, picture,
pamphlet, ballad, printed paper or other thing containing ob-
scen, indeceent or impure language, or manifestly tending to the
corruption of the youth as defined in sections and to mvesti-
gate and recommend the prosecution of all violations of said
sections. "66 In the course of performing its duty the Com-
mission would contact distributors of publications found to be
objectionable and seek their cooperation. Apparently the Com-
63 Id. at 497-98. The concurring opinion also contains a history of Post Of-
fice censorship. See also Lockhart & McClure, supra note 4, at 35-39; Paul and
Schwartz, Obscenity tn the Mails: A Comment on Some Problems of Federal
Censorship, 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 214 (1957).
64 Id. at 519.
6583 Sup. Ct. 631 (1968).
66 Id. at 633.
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mission was not above attempting a little coercion. The trial
court found:
The effect of the said notices [those received by Silver-
stem, including the two listing publications of appellants]
were clearly to intimidate the various book and mag-
azine wholesale distributors and retailers and to cause
them, by reason of such intimidation and threat of prose-
cution, (a) to refuse to take new orders for the proscribed
publications, (b) to cease selling any of the copies on hand,
(c) to withdraw from retailers all unsold copies, and (d)
to return all unsold copies to the publishers.
The activities of the respondens [appellees here] have
resulted in the suppression of the sal eand circulation of
the books listed in said notices. 67
In upholding the trial court the Supreme Court, speaking by
Mr. Justice Brennan, stated
It is not as if this were not regulation by the State of
Rhode Island. The acts and practices of the members and
Executive Secretary of the Commission disclosed on this
record were performed under color of state law and so con-
stituted acts of the State within the meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment. These acts and practices directly
and designedly stopped the circulation of publications in
many parts of Rhode Island. It is true, as noted by the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island, that Silverstein was "free"
to ignore the Commission's notices, in the sense that his re-
fusal to "cooperate" would have violated no law But it was
found as a fact-and the finding, being amply supported by
the record, binds us-that Silverstein s compliance with the
Commission s directives was not voluntary People do not
lightly disregard public officers thinly veiled threats to
institute criminal proceedings against them if they do not
come around, and Silverstem s reaction, according to un-
controverted testimony, was no exception to this general
rule. The Commissions notices, phrased virtually as or-
ders, reasonably understood to be such by the distributor,
invariably followed up by police visitations, in fact stopped
the circulation of the listed publications ex proprio vigore.
It would be naive to credit the States assertion that these
blacklists are in the nature of mere legal advice, when
they plainly serve as instruments of regulation indepen-
dent of the laws against obscenity
671d. at 635-36.
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What Rhode Island has done, in fact, has been to sub-
ject the distribution of publicatoms to a system of prior
administrative restraints, since the Commission is not a
judicial body and its decisions to list partcular publications
as objectionable do not follow judicial determinations that
such publications may lawfully be banned. Any system
of prior restraints of expression comes to the Court bear-
ing a heavy presumption against its constitutional val-
idity
The procedures of the Commission are radically de-
ficient. They fall far short of the constitutional require-
ments of governmental regulation of obscenity We hold
that the system of informal censorship disclosed by this
record violates the Fourteenth Amendment.68
The opinion concluded with some vague assurances that
private consultations between law enforcement officials and dis-
tributors will not violate the Constitution. As pointed out by
Mr. Justice Clark, the majority "drops a demolition bomb on
'the Commission's practice' without clearly indicating what might
be salvaged from the wreckage." 69
The dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan criticizes the
failure of the majority to consider and weigh the juvenile de-
linquency problem which the Commission is endeavoring to
cope with. He also criticizes the failure of the Court to clarify
the status of the Commission's activities minus the threats. It
is emphasized that the pronouncements of the Commission are
not self-executing and therefore cannot constitute censorship
without adequate procedural safeguards. If the group's activi-
ties actually result in depriving the adult public of access to
protected publications this problem shoud be dealt with when
it actually arises.
Times Film Corp. v. City of Chtcago70 is the one Supreme
Court decision which departs from the over-all trend. The
specific issue in that case was whether a municipal ordinance
requiring motion pictures to be submitted for examination prior
to public exhibition is void on its face. In a 5-4 decision the
majority, speaking by Mr. Justice Clark, upheld the ordinance
against this attack. The constitutionality of the standards to be
6SId. at 688-40.
69 Id. at 642.
70365 U.S. 43 (1961).
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utilized by the licensing board and the nature of the film itself
were not issues before the Court.
Petitioner claims that the nature of the film is irrele-
vant, and that even if this film contains the basest type of
pornography, or incitement to not, or forceful overthrow
of orderly government, it may nonetheless be shown with-
out prior submission for examination.71
After an analysis of the decision in Near v. Minnesota72 the
majority concluded that in relation to obscenity the examination
of films beforehand does not result in invalid prior restraint.
If the film is obscene it is not entitled to protection and if it is
not obscene a license will theoretically be granted without re
strictions. Mr. Chief Justice Warren wrote a dissenting opinion
concurred in by Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan. Mr.
Justice Douglas wrote a separate dissent concurred in by the
Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Black. In his opinion the Chief
Justice accused the majority of approving unlimited censorship
of motion pictures and of sanctioning procedures which could
easily be extended to other media of communication. Numerous
cases were cited and discussed, the majority of these involving
publications not concerned in any way with sex. 3
The dissent's summarization of the majority opinion as
authorizing unlimited, uncontrolled censorship appears clearly
erroneous as a legal proposition. One must almost wonder
whether the dissenting judges were furnished the same majority
opinion as the one published. A substantial portion of the dis-
sent is thus directed at a "straw man." The very least that can
be said is that the rationale of the majority was carried to its
logical extreme by the dissenters and then attacked as if the
majority had actually gone there.
However, the dissent also stresses the practical effect of the
principles enunciated by the other five Justices, and the argu-
ments presented along this line appear to have considerably
more merit.74 As pointed out in the opinion, the time and ex-
pense involved in appealing a censor's decision is such that
71 Id. at 47.
72283 U.S. -697 (1981).
A quick count shows twenty-one prior decisions cited. Of these sixteen
bad notung whatsoever to do with obscenity.
74See quotation from opinion, note 2 supra.
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probably in the great majority of cases the publisher will simply
acquiesce in the censor's decision, even if clearly illegal. Only
in those cases where the licensing board absolutely refuses to
grant the license under any circumstances might it be econom-
ically feasible to judicially contest an abuse of discretion.
Both dissenting opinions elaborated upon the evils of prior
restraint both in the case before the Court and in general.
Several observations should be made with respect to the
Times decision. As indicated above, the majority certainly
deviated from the pattern. The actual issue in that case was
a relatively narrow one although concededly important from a
practical standpoint. Moreover the Court had ample precedent
for its decision. In previous litigations involving the validity
of the standards to be used by the censor it was certainly implicit
in the reasoning of the Court that licensing requirements were
valid as such.75
Two members of the majority are no longer on the Court;
all the dissenters remain. This fact shouldn't be overlooked
either.
In short, the Times decision should not be relied on too
strongly. It may not be the law much longer. A judicial re-
versal here should surprise no one.
From a procedural standpoint, then, the governing prin-
ciples of law are amazingly unclouded and uncomplicated. There
appears to be no way either the federal government or the state
can legally prevent the publication or dissemination of ob-
scenity. The only remedy available is the imposition of penal
sanctions after a full judicial proceeding and, of course, after
the deed has been accomplished. Judging from the decision
in Bantam Books, even the activities of private pressure groups
will be held invalid if there is any cooperation or participation
by law enforcement officials.76 The Court is evidently ready to
condemn any procedure, other than criminal punishment, which
may result in discouraging or restricting unhampered dissem-
ination of sex publications. Only the Times case points in any
751Reference is here made to such cases as Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495 (1952); Superior Films, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, 346 U.S. 587
(1954); Holmby Productions, Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870 (1955). These deci-
sions were based on the absence of sufficiently definite standards.
76 See notes 65-69 supra and accompanying text.
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other direction and even this limited exception may not be with
us much longer.
Summary and Concluston
In the Roth case the Supreme Court declared that obscene
and pornographic publications were not entitled to constitu-
tional protection as free speech. Since that time, with the ex-
ception of one decision,77 the Court has drained the principles
enunciated in Roth of all vitality. From the legal standpoint
the barriers to effective regulation are virtually insurmountable.
It will be almost as difficult to prove obscenity as to prove, for
example, monopolization under the anti-trust laws.
Let us take a concrete illustration. The circular referred
to previously soliciting orders for a new magazine"s contains
descriptions of articles contained therein. Note the following:
Americas Greatest Sex Experiment-An account of
the mass test of "ommgamy" which took place at Oneida,
N.Y., during the second half of the 19th century Every
adult male had call on every adult female in this un-
precedented experiment in communal conjugal relations.
The Love Lives of Pirates-The fruit of years of patient
research by a French scholar, this fascinating study de-
scribes the fates of noblewomen kidnapped on the high
seas. Portions of diaries are reproduced.
The Erotic Sculpture of India-Twenty-two pages of
statuary depictig the Hindu Art of Love, photographed
by Eliot Elisofon, with text by Santha Rama Rau.
Love on the Beach-A documentary of amorous carry-
nags-on down by the sea, photographed by day and by
night.
The Private Parts of the Public Library-A survey of
the "Hell Room," "Treasure Room," "Delta Collection,"
"Cherry Case" and other collections of erotic literature in
American public institutions which are paid for by the
public but which are barred from their use.
Madame Tellier's Brothel-A new, uncensored trans-
lation of De Maupassant's classic short story on prosti-
tutes, illustrated by Degas monotypes that have never
been seen before in this country
The Male Prostitues of Bombay-Full-color photographs
of Indian youths who make a profession of dressing and
behaving like women.
77Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).7 8 Note 3 supra.
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Animal Sexuality-Full-color illustrations of animals in
sexual congress, meticulously drawn by a German zoolog-
ical illustrator.
Masterpieces of Erotic Art-Reproductions of erotic
paintings will be a regular feature of EROS. They will
include the unknown or long-suppressed work of such
masters as Rodin, Raphael, Rubens, Tintoretto, Titian,
Rembrandt, Michelangelo, Beardsley, Horgath, Toulouse-
Lautrec and Picasso.
Vice in Old New York-A guided tour of the quarters
of sm that pock-marked "New Sodom," as the city was
called in Victorian times. Included are visits to the Cre-
morne where girls danced the cancan without under-
garments, the House of All Nations where the ceilings were
mirrored and the Union where nude women publicly made
love to men and/or beasts.
Pillow Books as Works of Art-A sublimely beautiful
portfolio of pages taken from the legendary love-making
manuals which are passed down from mother to daughter
in Japan.
The writer has not had the opportunity to read any of these
articles and consequently is not in a position to pass upon their
quality or nature. These descriptions are used here purely for
illustrative purposes.
Let us assume the articles hold at least as much "promise"
as they appear to. Is there anyway a municipality, for example,
may legally prohibit or restrict the sale of this publication, at
least as far as minors are concerned?
Complaining to the postal authorities will presumably be
of little help. The Department won't be able to prevent using
the mails until after a full judicial proceeding, even should
the publication be clearly pornographic. 79 If all sales were made
through the mail local authorities would have absolutely no power
thereover.
If distributed through local outlets, bookstores, magazine
stands, etc., the situation does not change appreciably. Any
attempt to seize the publications prior to sales or in some other
manner to prevent their sale will be invalid.80 Any attempt to
coerce or solicit the cooperation of the distributors will likewise
79 See notes 61-64 supra and accompanying text.
80 See notes 56-60 supra and accompanying text.
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be unlawful; probably at about the point such efforts become at
all effective. 8 '
If the distributor is arrested and charged with possession
for sale or sale of obscene publications the municipality and bet-
ter prepare for a long and almost certainly unsuccessful prosecu-
tion.
Is the "dominant theme" of the material taken as a whole
"appealing to the prurient interest"? The publisher of the par-
ticular magazine asserts the following about his publication:
In EROS, the talents of the world's most gifted writers,
artists and photographers have been harnessed and ap-
plied to a periodical of elegance and good taste. Subjects
which are customarily sensationalized or degraded are
handled in EROS with dignity and grace. The publica-
tion of EROS represents a major break through in the
battle for the liberation of the human spirit.
Truly a commendable objective and one wouldn t wish to
go on record as opposing the "liberation of the human spirit."
If there is any semblance of truth to these assertions the matter
is concluded, either because the dominant theme is not appeal-
ing to "prurient interest" or because any obscenity which exists
is "ideological." Furthermore, liberating the human spirit cer-
tainly has redeeming social importance.
The issue of patent offensiveness would probably never be
reached. If it were, these features at their worst would hardly
be more patently offensive than the publication involved in
Manuel Enterprses.8 2
Then there is the question of "prurient interest" appeal
to the average man. Could the sale of these magazines to minors
be prohibited? This appears to be the one still unresolved ques-
tion or, actually, series of questions. Should the Court allow a
"variable obscenity" test, numerous subsidiary issues would be
spawned. What would be the verbal formula? How could it be
enforced?
Finally, even if the publication should be found obscene
81 See notes 65-69 supra and accompanying text. Consider also the possi-
bility of any concerted boycott by a pnvate group constituting a per se violation
of the Federal Anti-Trust laws. See Council of Defense v. International Magazine
Co., 267 Fed. 390 (1920).82See text accompanying note 33 supra.
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the State would still have to show that the seller of the publica-
tion had knowledge of its obscene nature.1s This could prove to
be a difficult task. From the distributor s standpoint it might
even be considered very unfair to impose upon him a duty to
pass upon the obscenity of a publication. How is he supposed
to determine as to each of hundreds of publications that which
even the experts are unable to determine.
Further elaboration should not be necessary. The writer
has already expressed his opinion on the present state of the law
and will take only one more parting shot. It appears the Court
again takes a many sided problem and focuses its entire atten-
tion on one aspect thereof to the exclusion of all others. Freedom
of expression is a principle well worth protecting. Few will ques-
tion this proposition. However, the writer seriously questions
the wisdom of carrying this principle to ludicrous extremes.
The lessons of history should have taught by now the error and
the folly of extremes. Inevitably there comes a reaction and a
swing toward the opposite extreme. It is felt that the Court is
now laying the predicate for that reaction and is in effect en-
dangering that which it most desires to protect. Certainly the
solution to the problem of obscene publications is not an easy
one but "doctrinaire absolutism" hardly seems the best approach.
Those inclined toward crowing about the current state of
the law might be well advised to take note of the remark used
by Mr. Justice Black in a dissenting opmion:84 "Another such
victory and I am undone."
83 See notes 45-52 supra and accompanying text.
84 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952).
